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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Marvin Tomas-Velasquez was convicted of one count of felony
trafficking in methamphetamine, one count of misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and one
count of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.
Mr. Tomas-Velasquez asserts that the district court erred by admitting evidence and
testimony at trial after the court ruled prior to trial that the evidence and testimony was
inadmissible due to the late disclosure of the scope of the State's expert's testimony.
Mr. Tomas-Velasquez further contends the evidence was insufficient to establish either
constructive or actual possession of the marijuana and the drug paraphernalia.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's assertions that: (1) further
documentation, such as the State's discovery responses, the district court's decision, and the
defendant's motion, are necessary in order to determine error, and (2) that any error was
harmless.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Tomas-Velasquez's Appellant's Brief They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by admitting evidence it had previously ruled inadmissible for
failure to comply with expert witness disclosure requirements under I.C.R. 16?

II.

Was there sufficient evidence that Mr. Tomas-Velasquez possessed marijuana and drug
paraphernalia? 1

1

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Tomas-Velasquez fully addressed the State's failure to present
sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could find he possessed the marijuana and drug
paraphernalia, and the arguments set forth in the Respondent's Brief merit no further argument.
(App. Br., pp.11-15; Resp. Br., pp.18-21.)
2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Permitting The Prosecutor To Question Officer McCarthy Regarding
Average Methamphetamine Prices, Where The Court Ruled Prior To Trial That Such Testimony
Was Inadmissible
The State claimed that, in order to establish an abuse of discretion, Mr. Tomas-Velasquez
was required to produce either a written motion or order on the motion in limine, or the State's
full discovery disclosures. (Resp. Br., p.11.) However, the State misunderstands Mr. TomasVelasquez's arguments. It is clear from the hearing transcripts that the district court reversed its
pre-trial decision during trial, and written orders and motions that were never created are not
needed to establish the error.
The State conceded that the district court found a defect in the State's initial disclosure"that it did not include the facts or data Detective McCarthy would be relying upon to provide
his testimony about the street value of methamphetamine." (Resp. Br., p.11, n.5.) The absence
of the discovery in the appellate record does not preclude review where Mr. Tomas-Velasquez's
assertion of error is not that the district court initially ruled incorrectly as to the exclusion of the
expert witness's testimony due to the State's late disclosure.
Mr. Tomas-Velasquez did not assert error in the district court's pre-trial decision. In his
Appellant's Brief, Mr. Tomas-Velasquez wrote:
Thus, the State was required to fully disclose the extent of the expert's opinions.
As the district court held, it failed to do so here. "[W]hat the facts or data he's
relying on to form the opinion about what the prices were, is not contained in the
state's initial disclosure." (7/2/19 Tr., p.11, Ls.7-12.) The district court (initially)
correctly excluded Officer McCarthy's testimony regarding the price for
methamphetamine in December of 2018, as a sanction for the State's late
disclosure.
(App. Br., p.10.) Mr. Tomas-Velasquez asserted error in the district court's misremembering of
its prior decision and the reasoning behind the pre-trial decision:
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[A]t trial the court misremembered its decision and permitted the officer to testify
to the average price of the substance, to the detriment of Mr. Tomas-Velasquez' s
defense. By admitting the testimony, the district court abused its discretion by
failing to act consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it and by failing to reach its decision by the exercise of
reason.
(App. Br., p.5.) Further, as the State pointed out, the pertinent portions of the problematic expert
disclosure were read to the district court by the prosecution, and the district court relied on the
oral recitation from the prosecutor in ruling on the motion. (Resp. Br., pp.7-8.)
In this case, eight days before trial, defense counsel brought it to the court's attention that
the State had made a post-discovery deadline disclosure of a report from a proposed expert-a
narcotics officer. (7/2/19 Tr., p.6, Ls.17-19.) Defense counsel summarized the substance ofthe
June 16, 2019 report:
That report seems to indicate that he would - the proposed testimony is the street
value of methamphetamine, and the reason that the state believes it's relevant is
that they intend to introduce a series of text messages that are purportedly
between Mr. Tomas-Velasquez and a third party where there is some discussion
of exchanging, presumably, drugs for certain dollar amounts.
(7/2/19 Tr., p.6, L.19 - p.7, L.14.) The prosecutor admitted its additional disclosure was late-he
submitted an additional disclosure because he was worried that his prior May expert witness
disclosure was insufficient, as it did not identify the source of Detective McCarthy's knowledge
about the street price of methamphetamine. (7/2/19 Tr., p.7, L.15 - p.9, L.24.) The prosecutor
then asked the district court for a continuance in order to comply with the disclosure
requirements ofl.C.R. 16. (7/2/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.11-13.)
The district court read the requirements ofl.C.R. 16(7) and concluded:
Here, it appears the state wants to introduce an opinion by this police officer
about the street price of methamphetamine in various quantities in some
time frame, I'd imagine, close to when this occurred.
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From what [the prosecutor] just told me, that was not in, well, other than
mentioning that he'd talk about prices, what prices were, what the facts or data
he's relying on to form the opinion about what the prices were, is not contained in
the state's initial disclosure. It sounds like the state's initial disclosure was two
weeks after my cutoff for compliance with discovery in any event.
I'll find that the state's disclosure is both untimely and inadequate. I'll exclude
that testimony from trial.
(7/2/19 Tr., p.11, Ls.2-17.) The court found that the State's first disclosure did not disclose what
facts or data the expert was relying on to form his opinion, and that the second disclosure was
two week after the court's deadline.
The district court denied the State's motion for a continuance, and ruled as follows:
Well, I'm not going to move the trial date. I'm going to exclude the state's
expert. Frankly this simply should have been done on time. It should have been
done better than it was. It sounds to me like the state has other avenues by which
it can attempt to prove this case. I'll simply leave it to lie in the bed that it made.
I'll keep this on for trial.
(7/2/19 Tr., p.22, Ls.6-14.)

The district court repeated, "I'm not going to exclude the text

messages themselves. I'm simply excluding the expert testimony." (7/2/19 Tr., p.23, Ls.2-4.)
The prosecutor said he did not think he would be able to match the weights and prices of
methamphetamine to the text messages he sought to admit from December 14 to December 22. 2
(7/2/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.3-13.)

The prosecutor then asked the court about a photograph of

methamphetamine found on the LG phone taken six days before the incident, and the admission
of text messages sent and received by Mr. Tomas-Velasquez's phone. (7/2/19 Tr., p.23, L.24 p.26, L.10.) The district court ruled that such evidence would not be excluded on I.R.E. 403
grounds. (7/2/19 Tr., p.28, L.5 - p.31, L.7.)

2

These text messages from December 14-22, the week before Mr. Tomas-Velasquez's car was
stopped, were not germane to the issue of whether Mr. Tomas-Velasquez was in possession of a
trafficking quantity of methamphetamine on December 24, 2019.
5

At trial, the prosecutor called Officer McCarthy, and began asking him about
methamphetamine amounts. (Trial Tr., p.313, Ls.12-22.) When the prosecutor asked Officer
McCarthy about the price of an ounce of methamphetamine in December of 2018, defense
counsel objected. (Trial Tr., p.313, L.23 - p.314, L.3.) Outside the presence of the jury, the
prosecutor clarified his understanding of the district court's ruling on his motion in limine:
I believe that your ruling was that he was excluded as an expert and he could not
bring an opinion pursuant to our disclosure that the text messages found on the
phone were that of drug transactions. I'm asking him simply factual questions of
what, in his training and experience, that sold for on a particular date. That
requires no expert opinion under the rules of evidence.
(Trial Tr., p.314, 1.20 - p.315, L.2.) The district court determined that the information was
within the purview of I.R.E. 702 and held, "Here I think the State's initial disclosure was an
adequate one to put the defense on notice that Detective McCarthy would be answering the
question that he just got asked. And so I'll overrule the objection." (Trial Tr., p.316, Ls.7-11.)
Defense counsel reminded the court that it had "ruled that the State could not elicit
testimony about that specific pricing because that specific pricing was lacking in their initial
expert disclosure." (Trial Tr., p.317, Ls.15-24.) The district court then said:
Well, I apologize if there was some imprecision in my pretrial ruling. My
recollection of my ruling was I would not permit Detective McCarthy to give an
opinion about the particular text messages that, I guess are going to be offered
into evidence at some point in this case. I would not permit him to give an
opinion about whether he believed these two individuals, or either one of them,
was engaged in the sale of narcotics based on what he read on the phone. I would
[not] permit him to give an opinion that the text messages are talking about drugs.

I do believe the State's disclosure that they were going to ask him questions,
given his specialized knowledge as a police officer, about price and how drugs are
sold was adequate and was timely made. And so I'll permit him to answer the
question that was asked.
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(Trial Tr., p.318, L.23-p.319, L.24.) However, the district court's "recollection" of its ruling at
trial was inaccurate. Thus, it was not correcting an "imprecision" in its prior ruling, but was
reversing its prior decision.
previous ruling.

The district court's ruling was a complete about face from its

Prior to trial, the district court excluded Officer McCarthy's testimony

regarding the price for methamphetamine in December of 2018, as a sanction for the State's late
disclosure. At trial, the district court admitted the same testimony it had previously prohibited,
changing its prior ruling to the detriment of the defense.
The district court therefore abused its discretion by misremembering that it had ruled the
expert testimony was inadmissible due to the incomplete initial disclosure and the late
supplemental disclosure.
The State cannot show the error was harmless. Mr. Tomas-Velasquez's defense was
surprised by the district court's sudden change. Defense counsel had no notice that the district
court, who had clearly prohibited testimony from Officer McCarthy on the prices for various
weights of methamphetamine before trial, would suddenly reverse its decision in the middle of
trial. This reversal was to the defense's detriment and hampered Mr. Tomas-Velasquez's ability
to meet the evidence at trial, as the defense no longer had time to arrange for testimony to refute
this new evidence. Officer McCarthy testified that one ounce of methamphetamine could be sold
for between $300-$600 in December of 2018. (Trial Tr., p.322, Ls.3-10.) Now the jurors could
link the numbers in the text messages to their discussion of weight, as the prosecutor urged them
to do in his closing statement. (See State's Exh. 15; Trial Tr., p.459, Ls.5-11.) The testimony
brought meaning to the content of the text messages retrieved from the LG phone in Mr. TomasVelasquez's possession, and thereby harmed his defense.
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The State claims it presented "overwhelming evidence" of Mr. Tomas-Velasquez's
possession of the methamphetamine in the car (Resp. Br., p.18); however, this case involved two
defendants.

The State ignores the fact that the female co-defendant knew how much

methamphetamine was in the car at the time it was stopped by law enforcement. (See State's
Exh. 12 (jail call late the night of the arrest in which Ashley Tomas-Velasquez is heard telling
the person on the line that there was four ounces in the car); Trial Tr., p.462 L.16 - p.463, L.11)
(the prosecutor reminding the jury of what Ashley told her friend over the phone that night-that
there were "four ounces").) Further, two of the bags containing methamphetamine were found
between the passenger seat (where Ashley was sitting) and the center console, squeezed under
the passenger's seat cushion. (Trial Tr., p.174, L.7 - p.175, L.22; p.376, Ls.2-4.) These were in
addition to the bag of methamphetamine behind her leg at the time of the stop. (Trial Tr., p.168,
Ls.7-11.) Where the jury was tasked with deciding whether Mr. Tomas-Velasquez or his exwife, Ashley Tomas-Velasquez, (or both) possessed the trafficking amount of methamphetamine,
the officer's testimony establishing the street value of methamphetamine linked the dollar
amounts purportedly contained in the text messages on Mr. Tomas-Velasquez's phone, the
expert's testimony was certainly not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Tomas-Velasquez respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction and remand his case to the district court for a new trial on the trafficking count.
DATED this 20 th day ofNovember, 2020.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20 th day of November, 2020, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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